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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are scholars who teach and write about 
constitutional law and federal structure. Jonathan 
Adler is Johan Verheji Memorial Professor of Law at 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 
where he teaches constitutional and administrative 
law and directs the Center for Business Law and 
Regulation. Lynn Baker is Frederick M. Baron Chair 
in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, 
where she teaches state and local government law. 
Randy Barnett is Carmack Waterhouse Professor of 
Legal Theory at Georgetown University Law Center, 
where he teaches constitutional law and directs the 
Georgetown Center for the Constitution. Dale 
Carpenter is Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties Law at the University of 
Minnesota Law School, where he teaches 
constitutional law and sexual orientation and the 
law. Ilya Somin is Professor of Law at George Mason 
University School of Law, where he teaches 
constitutional law. Ernest Young is Alston & Bird 
Professor of Law at Duke Law School, where he 
teaches constitutional law and federal courts. Each 
                                            
 
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel 
for a party has written this brief in whole or in part, and no 
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund 
the preparation or submission of this brief. No person or entity, 
other than the amici curiae or their counsel, has made a 
monetary contribution to this brief’s preparation or submission. 
2 
 
 
 
has written about the federalism issues that this 
cases raises.  
The signatories of this brief hold a variety of 
opinions about same-sex marriage and about how the 
Constitution’s individual-rights provisions may bear 
on regulation of those marriages. But we agree that 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)2 is 
an unconstitutional and unprecedented incursion into 
States’ police powers.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Before this Court addresses whether DOMA 
denies equal protection of the laws, there is a prior 
question of federal power. This question is prior not 
only because DOMA cannot stand if it falls outside 
Congress’s authority but also because DOMA can 
only survive an equal-protection challenge if it serves 
federal interests within Congress’s legislative 
jurisdiction. As Chief Justice Marshall recognized in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, only ends “within the scope 
of the constitution” are “legitimate.”  17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). That is true regardless of 
the level of scrutiny that this Court applies to Ms. 
Windsor’s equal-protection claim. 
DOMA falls outside Congress’s powers. Marriage 
is not commercial activity, and DOMA is not limited 
                                            
 
2 This brief does not address the validity of DOMA’s other 
provisions, and we refer to Section 3 simply as “DOMA.” 
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to federal-benefit programs that might rest on the 
Spending Clause. Any action by Congress that falls 
outside its specifically enumerated powers must be 
justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and 
DOMA cannot pass that test. DOMA’s definition of 
marriage is not “incidental” to an enumerated power, 
see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 
S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012), because—as the Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group has said—its purpose is to 
make social policy regarding domestic relations 
rather than “carry into execution” some federal 
enumerated power. DOMA’s definition is also not 
“plainly adapted” to an enumerated end, see 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421, because it 
applies to more than 1100 federal statutes at once. 
Congress has never even considered how defining 
marriage to exclude same-sex couples will affect most 
of these statutory regimes, and BLAG does not 
defend DOMA in those terms. Finally, DOMA’s 
definition is not “proper,” see Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997), because it violates the 
States’ equal sovereignty and lacks a limiting 
principle to cabin its usurpation of state control over 
domestic relations. 
“[U]nder the Constitution, the regulation and 
control of marital and family relationships are 
reserved to the States.” Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 
343, 354 (1948). DOMA represents an unprecedented 
intrusion into this domain. That is true even though 
Congress has enacted statutes, such as for cross-
border enforcement of child-custody and support 
orders, within the sphere of domestic relations. Our 
4 
 
 
 
claim is not that family law is an exclusive field of 
state authority, but rather that certain powers within 
that field—such as the power to define the basic 
status relationships of parent, child, and spouse—are 
reserved to the States.  
Congress’s establishment of a competing federal 
definition of family undermines the States’ sovereign 
authority to define, regulate, and support family 
relationships. Federal law is massively intertwined 
with state law, and state officials implement many 
federal programs, like Medicaid, in parallel with their 
own legal regimes. DOMA thus wreaks confusion and 
imposes substantial administrative costs that 
undermine States’ attempts to define marriage for 
themselves. These contradictory legal regimes impose 
costs on individuals as well, who cannot rely on a 
single body of law to settle their domestic status or 
hold a single set of officials politically accountable. 
DOMA’s appropriation of the power to define 
marriage cannot be justified as simply defining a 
term relevant to administering federal programs. The 
statute is not called the “Defense of Marriage Act” for 
nothing: Congress did not act, say, to make ERISA 
function more smoothly, but rather because it wished 
to establish and promote a national definition of 
marriage to compete with States’ changing 
definitions. BLAG’s argument in defense of DOMA 
could not be clearer on this point. It asserts that “the 
federal government has the same latitude as the 
states to adopt its own definition of marriage for 
federal-law purposes.” Br. 19. 
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BLAG is wrong. The legitimacy of same-sex 
marriage is a difficult and divisive issue, yet it is one 
that our federalism has been addressing with 
considerable success. Congress may regulate in this 
area to the extent necessary to further its 
enumerated powers. But it may not simply reject the 
States’ policy judgments as if it had the same 
authority to make domestic-relations law as they do. 
That is the difference between a government with a 
general police power and a government of limited and 
enumerated powers. And it is sufficient to decide this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE 
POWER MUST INFORM THIS COURT’S 
ANALYSIS OF DOMA UNDER EQUAL-
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
Whether same-sex couples can marry is an 
evolving, unresolved, and contentious debate. A slight 
majority of Americans approve of same-sex marriage, 
but many disapprove.3 States’ domestic-relations 
laws reflect evolving public opinion. Nine States and 
the District of Columbia issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples. Another five States permit them to 
                                            
 
3 Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW FORUM ON 
RELIGIOUS AND PUBLIC LIFE (Nov. 2012), 
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/. 
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enter into civil unions with full spousal rights. Five 
more permit domestic partnerships conferring some 
or all rights and obligations of married couples. Two 
States recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. But 
thirty-eight States, including some that permit civil 
unions or domestic partnerships, have prohibited 
same-sex marriage. 
The Framers designed the federal system to allow 
States exactly this freedom to experiment and to 
debate contentious policy issues.4 DOMA is an 
unprecedented federal intervention into this debate. 
For the first time, Congress has created an across-
the-board federal-marital status that exists 
independently from, and in some cases conflicts with, 
States’ marital-status determinations. 
BLAG argues that DOMA serves five interests: 
DOMA (1) preserves each sovereign’s ability to define 
marriage for itself, (2) ensures a nationally uniform 
definition of marriage, (3) preserves earlier 
Congresses’ legislative judgments and protects the 
federal fisc, (4) maintains the status quo, and (5) 
serves the aims (such as promoting families and 
procreation) that States rejecting same-sex marriage 
have sought to promote. Br. 30-49. Those are 
                                            
 
4 See Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: 
Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic, CATO POL’Y 
ANALYSIS no. 570, Jun. 1, 2006, at 10 available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa570.pdf. 
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interests that a State might assert under its police 
power. When this Court considers whether DOMA—
under any standard of equal-protection review—
serves legitimate government objectives, it can and 
should consider whether those ends fall within 
Congress’s enumerated powers.  
The Framers established federalism and 
separation of powers as a “double security” protecting 
“the rights of the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 
320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). By 
pressing the national majority’s policy preferences on 
every State in the Nation in an area of intense 
national disagreement, DOMA embodies the sort of 
threat to liberty federalism was designed to prevent. 
A. Congress Has No Legitimate 
Interest in Defining Marriage 
Because It Lacks Enumerated 
Power to Do So. 
Under any level of scrutiny, DOMA is constitu-
tional only if it serves legitimate federal purposes. 
For an “end [to] be legitimate,” it must be “within the 
scope of the constitution.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 421. DOMA serves no legitimate purpose 
because its ends are not “within the scope of the 
constitution.” As we explain, the federal government 
lacks constitutional authority to determine marital 
status in a blanket way. 
Limiting Congress to enumerated objectives is all 
the more important in this case because the Court 
must decide which government to defer to—the 
States or Congress. The Court’s tiers of scrutiny in 
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equal-protection analysis reflect judgments about the 
degree of deference owed to legislative decision-
makers. Rational-basis review, in particular, 
presumes that judges should leave basic value and 
policy judgments to the appropriate political 
branches. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 313 (1993). 
But Congress intentionally enacted DOMA to 
reject state governments’ policy judgments. Thus this 
case does not involve a simple choice between a 
court’s judgment and “the” legislature’s; it forces a 
choice between the New York legislature and Con-
gress. Limiting Congress to enumerated objectives 
balances and guides that difficult inquiry. Outside 
the enumerated powers, the States—not Congress—
are entitled to deference. 
B. Restraints on National Power Are 
an Integral Part of the 
Constitution’s Guarantees of Equal 
Protection and Individual Liberty. 
“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting 
the boundary between different institutions of gov-
ernment for their own integrity. State sovereignty is 
not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of 
sovereign power.” Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2355, 2364 (2011). Respecting the limits of national 
power is as essential to protecting liberty as enforcing 
the Constitution’s substantive equality guarantees.  
For most of our history, the primary restraints on 
arbitrary and discriminatory action by the national 
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government have been federalism and separation of 
powers. In divisive social controversies like the 
debate over same-sex marriage, federalism lets each 
State and its citizens decide how to proceed, largely 
free of national pressure. Federal diversity of 
outcomes enables the democratic process to 
accommodate a higher proportion of our citizens’ 
views on the matter than would a uniform national 
answer. And it prevents the majority of States from 
impressing their policy preferences on the minority 
who want to recognize gay marriage. Lynn A. Baker 
& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 110 
(2001). “That gradualist approach puts the 
constitutional debate to one side and lowers the 
political temperature.” Richard A. Epstein, The 
Constitutionality of Proposition 8, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 879, 881 (2011). 
Moreover, letting each State decide preserves the 
exit option for both same-sex couples living in a 
jurisdiction prohibiting their marriage and strong 
opponents of the practice who do not wish to live in a 
State where it is legal. Indeed, exit may be a more 
effective way for citizens to express political 
preferences than voting in elections.   Ilya Somin, 
Foot Voting, Federalism, and Political Freedom 3-16 
(Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
No. 12-68 Oct. 12, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2
160388. The exit option also “makes government 
‘more responsive by putting the States in competition 
for a mobile citizenry.’” Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 
10 
 
 
 
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1991)). 
This exit right is critical to equal protection of the 
laws. “The right to travel and to move from one state 
to another has long been accepted,” and, “[i]n reality, 
right to travel analysis refers to little more than a 
particular application of equal protection analysis.” 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982) 
(collecting cases). That right is considerably less 
effectual, however, when national legislative action 
presses States to adopt a uniform outcome on a social 
controversy. “As long as the citizen’s right to exit 
local communities is guaranteed in a meaningful 
way, localism promotes diversity as an important 
barrier against moral tyranny on the national scale.” 
Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1787, 1872 (1995). 
State-by-state policy diversity also facilitates ex-
perimentation, which can help resolve divisive ques-
tions reflecting deep-seated individual views about 
rights. For example, Gonzales v. Oregon  applied 
separation-of-powers and federalism principles to 
prevent the Executive from preempting Oregon’s 
experiment with physician-assisted suicide. 546 U.S. 
243 (2006). To the extent that same-sex-marriage 
proponents and opponents disagree about its likely 
effect on traditional marriage, actual experience in 
States recognizing same-sex marriage could inform 
that debate. “Only when . . . competition between 
legal systems exists can we perceive which legal rules 
are most appropriate.” Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State 
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
11 
 
 
 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977). Thus 
BLAG’s argument that Congress enacted DOMA to 
wait and see how same-sex marriage would play out 
is exactly backwards. Br. 41-43. DOMA undermines 
and discourages those experiments by superimposing 
a uniform and inescapable federal definition of 
marriage. 
II. DOMA IS NEITHER A “NECESSARY” NOR A 
“PROPER” MEANS OF FURTHERING ANY OF 
CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED POWERS 
DOMA was enacted in 1996 to protect the 
“institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,” 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996), from the 
possibility that some States might legalize same-sex 
marriage. BLAG continues to insist that Congress 
has the power to define marital status because it is a 
“separate sovereign” just like the States. Br. 31. 
Not so. “Bedrock principles of federalism make 
clear,” BLAG Br. 19, that Congress never has the 
power to legislate on matters because States do. See 
U.S. CONST. Amend. X. Congress “can exercise only 
the powers granted to it.”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) at 405.5  
                                            
 
5 See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 289 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will 
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Congress surely has authority to refuse to 
recognize particular marriages when executing its 
enumerated powers. But it cannot define marital 
status in DOMA’s shotgun fashion. States derive the 
power to define marriage from their police powers, 
but Congress has no such power. Nor can Congress 
justify DOMA under the Commerce, Spending, or 
Necessary and Proper Clauses.  
This Court’s precedents and the Constitution’s 
history, text, and structure establish three 
independent requirements for “necessary and proper” 
laws. First, an unenumerated action must be but a 
means to an enumerated power or end and 
“incidental” to the power it purports “to carry into 
execution.” An incidental or implied power must be 
less significant than the enumerated powers. Any 
would-be power invoked in support of DOMA cannot 
be incidental because a general power to define 
marriage is such a great power that it would have to 
be enumerated—yet Article I, Section 8, enumerates 
no such power. 
Second, if the implied power is incidental, it must 
also be “necessary,” meaning “plainly adapted,” to an 
enumerated power. A federal definition of marriage 
that applies to more than 1100 federal statutes, 
however, is “plainly adapted” to none. Finally, a law 
                                                                                          
 
extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people . . . .”). 
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must be “proper,” which at the very least means it 
must not grant Congress unlimited power. But 
BLAG’s rationales for DOMA contain no limiting 
principle. Therefore, DOMA fails each requirement. 
A. DOMA Is Not Valid Commerce or 
Spending Clause Legislation. 
This Court’s Commerce Clause precedents have 
always held that “[t]he subject to be regulated [must 
be] commerce.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 72 (1824); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (Congress’s power is limited to 
“commercial activity”). DOMA does not purport to 
regulate interstate commerce. Although weddings 
may involve extensive commercial activity, marital 
status itself is not commerce, much less interstate 
commerce. 
Nor is DOMA justified under the Spending 
Clause. DOMA is not a narrow statute that applies 
only to federal benefit schemes. It indiscriminately 
governs all federal statutes and programs and affects 
more than 1100 federal statutes, many of which have 
nothing to do with the power of the purse.6 For 
instance, DOMA affects, among other things, 
copyright protection, government ethics, and 
                                            
 
6 See also H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 23 (1996) (failing to state 
any constitutional basis for Congress’s authority to enact DOMA 
and noting that “this legislation does not provide new budgetary 
authority or increased tax expenditures”). 
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testimonial privileges. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 31-2; 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 203(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b); Fed. R. 
Evid. 501; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 52-53 (1980).  
Even if DOMA were a spending statute, it would 
fail under this Court’s precedents. Viewed as a 
spending condition, DOMA requires States 
administering federal-benefit programs to refuse to 
recognize state-sanctioned marriages. Under schemes 
involving federal-state matching funds, DOMA may 
prohibit the expenditure of state money to couples 
entitled to those benefits under state law. No 
relevant federal-spending program clearly states a 
“no same-sex marriage” condition, see Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 
(2006) (conditions must be stated “unambiguously”); 
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987), and 
any such condition would operate retroactively for all 
federal programs that the States entered into before 
DOMA’s enactment in 1996, see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 
2606 (“[T]hough Congress’ power to legislate under 
the spending power is broad, it does not include 
surprising participating States with post-acceptance 
or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”). Moreover, a condition 
cutting across so many federal programs, involving 
vast sums of money, would surely be coercive. See id. 
at 2604. 
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B. DOMA Is Not Incidental to an 
Enumerated Power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Since McCulloch, this Court has recognized that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause does not “license 
the exercise of any ‘great substantive and 
independent power[s]’ beyond those specifically 
enumerated.” Id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411).7  
The Necessary and Proper Clause therefore does 
not grant all conceivable implicit powers that could 
be useful to an enumerated power; it does not grant 
powers we would expect the Constitution to 
enumerate separately. Here, this Court confronts the 
same kind of question it decided in McCulloch and 
NFIB: Is the power to define marital status the sort 
we would expect to be enumerated? It is. 
In McCulloch, this Court upheld Congress’s power 
to incorporate a bank because the “power of creating 
a corporation” is not a “great substantive and 
                                            
 
7 Recent scholarship establishes that this “incidental” power 
doctrine was the legal default rule when the Constitution was 
ratified. See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, in Gary Lawson et al., The 
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause 52, 60-61 (2010) 
(explaining that at the founding an “incidental” power had to be 
“subordinate to” or “less worthy” than the power it was 
incidental to).  
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independent power.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
at 411. Chief Justice Marshall determined that a 
corporation is “never used for its own sake, but for 
the purpose of effecting something else.” Ibid. Thus, 
there was “no reason to suppose[] that a constitution, 
omitting . . . to enumerate all the means for carrying 
into execution the great powers vested in 
government, ought to have specified [chartering 
corporations].” Id. at 421. 
But in DOMA, defining marriage is not a means to 
an end; it is an end in itself. As even BLAG 
acknowledges, marriage is one of the “bedrock 
institutions” in our society. Br. 41-42; see Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is “one of 
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men”). The power to 
define marital status is therefore exactly the type of 
power we would expect the Constitution to 
enumerate. It is not, like chartering a corporation, a 
mere “means by which other objects are 
accomplished.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411. 
This case does not require this Court to say that 
Congress may never limit which marriages federal 
law will recognize. It is enough to say that nothing 
about DOMA is “incidental.”  
First, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
Congress may incidentally regulate intrastate 
economic activity that is not itself interstate 
commerce if that activity, in the aggregate, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
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(“Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate 
activities that are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce (including activities that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives 
from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”). But 
marriage is not itself an economic activity, and the 
economic effects of marriage do not make the activity 
itself economic in nature. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 615-16 (rejecting a broad view of “economic effects” 
because it would permit the federal government to 
regulate marriage, divorce, and childrearing).  
Second, Congress may also incidentally regulate 
intrastate noneconomic activity if doing so is 
“essential” to a broader regulation of interstate 
commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he power to enact laws enabling 
effective regulation of interstate commerce can only 
be exercised in conjunction with congressional 
regulation of an interstate market, and it extends 
only to those measures necessary to make the 
interstate regulation effective.”). But DOMA stands 
apart from any particular regulatory scheme, and 
BLAG defends it in terms that are unique to DOMA 
itself. Some federal statutory regimes do bear on 
marriage, but the statutes themselves generally 
contain a directive regarding marriage. Moreover, 
these schemes have generally taken state-family law 
as they found it, and exceptions to that principle have 
always been narrow and tailored to the needs of the 
particular federal program. 
Third, DOMA is not “narrow in scope” like the 
federal civil commitment program in United States v. 
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Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), or the immigration 
antifraud marriage provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i). As explained below, the antifraud 
provision withholds resident-alien status from some 
marriages, but only when the couple entered into the 
marriage to obtain a federal benefit fraudulently. The 
federal power to confer a benefit like resident-alien 
status includes the power to prevent someone from 
fraudulently obtaining the benefit. But that is not 
what DOMA accomplishes. 
BLAG cannot avoid this problem by insisting that 
DOMA merely limits federal benefits to traditional 
marriages or, to put it another way, that defining 
who may receive a benefit is incidental to the power 
of conferring a benefit under the Spending power. If 
that were DOMA’s true meaning, it would read very 
differently. Like the immigration antifraud provision, 
it would relate in some way to a statute’s benefit. But 
DOMA indiscriminately declares that, for the entire 
U.S. Code, marriage means opposite-sex marriages. 
Congress did not consider potential applications to 
particular statutes or programs. DOMA even 
undermines some statutes, such as ethics laws 
regulating gifts to federal officials’ spouses. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 31-2. The risks of corruption that those statutes 
combat are equally present when same-sex couples 
are involved, and federal law’s refusal to recognize 
the union amounts to willful myopia. 
Almost two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall 
counseled vigilance “should congress, under the 
pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the 
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the 
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government.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. 
DOMA’s broad sweep proves its real meaning: it 
creates a federal marital status to reflect Congress’s 
preference that States should not extend the right to 
marry to same-sex couples. But the power to 
determine who can marry “belongs to the laws of the 
States and not to the laws of the United States.” 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).  
C. DOMA Is Too Broad to Be “Plainly 
Adapted” to Congress’s Enumerated 
Powers. 
Since McCulloch this Court has held that a 
“necessary” law must have both a “legitimate” federal 
end “within the scope of the constitution” and some 
fit between that end and the means employed to 
pursue it. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. Congress has 
wide latitude to determine the fit between means and 
ends. See, e.g., id. at 413-15. But that latitude has 
limits. 
“This Court has not held that the Lee Optical test, 
asking if ‘it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct’ an 
evil, is the proper test in this context. Rather, under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, application of a 
‘rational basis’ test should be at least as exacting as it 
has been in the Commerce Clause cases, if not more 
so.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1966 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). “The 
rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause 
context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on 
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empirical demonstration.” Id. at 1967. Congress has 
never even attempted such a link in support of 
DOMA. 
In some contexts, administering a federal program 
might require federal officials to act based on a more-
limited understanding of “marriage” than state law 
might provide for. One example is the immigration 
antifraud provision, discussed above, that limits 
resident-alien status to members of a “qualifying 
marriage,” which excludes marriages that were 
“entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s 
admission as an immigrant.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i). It is at least conceivable that, in 
particular situations, the national government could 
demonstrate a need (apart from desiring to encourage 
a particular definition of marriage) to exclude same-
sex couples. But, although the Necessary and Proper 
Clause might support a targeted limitation of state-
conferred marital status for federal purposes, DOMA 
is a sawed-off shotgun. A federal definition of 
marriage that indiscriminately applies to more than 
1100 federal statutes and programs can be “plainly 
adapted” to none of them. 
The Court has historically deferred to Congress’s 
assessment that legislation is “necessary” to exercise 
an enumerated power. If courts are to defer to 
Congress’s judgments about fit, however, they should 
at least insist that Congress legislate in a way that 
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allows those judgments to be made.8 Congress has 
made no judgment here that treating same-sex 
couples as unmarried will, say, contribute to the 
efficient operation of ERISA or some other federal 
program. Until it does, DOMA should not be upheld 
as “plainly adapted” to any constitutional exertion of 
national authority under Congress’s enumerated 
powers. 
D. DOMA Is Not a Proper Means for 
Executing Any Enumerated Power. 
Laws that violate core constitutional principles 
like state sovereignty and enumerated powers are 
improper. For instance, Printz struck down a federal 
law requiring state officials to conduct background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers: “When a 
‘La[w] . . . violates the principle of state sovereignty 
reflected in . . . various constitutional provisions . . . it 
is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution 
the Commerce Clause.’” 521 U.S. at 923-24 (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
                                            
 
8 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“[E]ven [under] 
the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the 
relation between the classification adopted and the object to be 
attained. The search for the link between classification and 
objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it 
provides guidance and discipline for the legislature, which is 
entitled to know what sorts of laws it can pass; and it marks the 
limits of our own authority.”).  
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Instead, it is “merely an act of usurpation which 
deserves to be treated as such.” Ibid. This Court 
again held, in Alden v. Maine,  that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause does not vest Congress with the 
“incidental authority to subject the States to private 
suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise 
within the scope of the enumerated powers” because 
such authority is not proper. 527 U.S. 706, 732 
(1999). 
Just last Term, a majority of Justices determined 
that the individual-health-insurance mandate may 
have been “necessary” to insurance reform but that it 
was not “proper.” They stressed that upholding the 
mandate would have granted the federal government 
unlimited power to impose other mandates. NFIB, 
132 S. Ct. at 2588 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2646 (joint 
dissent). Because the government’s proffered 
rationales for its claim of power had no judicially 
administrable limit and could ultimately justify a 
national police power, the mandate violated the 
constitutional principle that “[t]he Federal 
Government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers.’” Id. at 2577 (Roberts, C.J.) 
(quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405). Here, 
too, the rationales offered in defense of Congress’s 
effort to define “marriage” have no obvious limit.  
The case against DOMA is even stronger than in 
Printz, Alden, and NFIB because, as we explain in 
Part III, DOMA invades a core area traditionally 
reserved to the States. Some limiting principle, 
especially in such areas, must restrict what Congress 
may do to effectuate federal programs. One can 
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imagine an argument, for example, that a 
comprehensive federal family code would promote 
uniformity in the administration of the many federal 
programs touching family relationships. In any event, 
if DOMA is upheld—allowing Congress to enact a 
blanket definition of “spouse” in opposition to state 
law—then surely Congress may also define “divorce,” 
“annulment,” “parent,” or “child” in Chapter 1 of Title 
1 of the U.S. Code. And it could do so, not to further 
specific federal programs, but simply to promote its 
preferred domestic-relations policies. Such a result 
would tear down limits on Congress’s powers set forth 
in Article I, Section 8. 
DOMA also violates the principle of equal 
sovereignty between States by burdening those 
States that extend marriage to same-sex couples. For 
instance, Massachusetts has shown that it “stands 
both to assume new administrative burdens and to 
lose funding for Medicaid or veterans’ cemeteries 
solely on account of its same-sex marriage laws.” 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). This burden is a 
“departure from the fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty” between the States. Nw. Austin Mun. 
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009). The federal government is not 
entitled to “differentiate[] between States” because 
authorizing same-sex marriage is not the type of 
“local evil” that NAMUDNO suggested could justify 
distinctions under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Ibid. 
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The Founders recognized this principle of 
“propriety.” See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, 
The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: a Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 
267, 297 (1993) (in the founding era “proper” meant 
that laws “must be consistent with principles of 
separation of powers, principles of federalism, and 
individual rights”). As Alexander Hamilton 
recognized, “[t]he propriety of a law, in a 
constitutional light, must always be determined by 
the nature of the powers upon which it is founded.” 
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton then stated 
that any attempt by the federal government to “vary 
the law of descent in any State” would be improper. 
Ibid. But DOMA accomplishes just such an 
“improper” result by altering marital status conferred 
by the States. 
Nor can two of the purported federal interests 
BLAG advances save DOMA. First, the argument 
that federal statutes need a federal definition of 
marriage is disingenuous. Before DOMA, federal law 
took state law as it found it. DOMA continues to 
tolerate state differences on marriage. See Br. Amici 
Curiae Family Law Professors 5-18. It recognizes 
legal unions regardless of age differences, diseases, or 
how closely related two spouses might be, even 
though individual States differ significantly on these 
points. DOMA picks only one issue—same-sex 
marriage—and declares a federal public policy 
without even finding that same-sex marriages 
somehow undermine an enumerated power. See 
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United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 
730 (1979) (“reject[ing] generalized pleas for 
uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that 
adopting state law would adversely affect the 
administration of federal programs”). 
Second, DOMA is not a proper way to protect the 
public fisc. DOMA does in some cases—such as Ms. 
Windsor’s—save the government money. Whether it 
saves the government money overall remains 
uncertain, but rational-basis review generally lets the 
government guess incorrectly. Massachusetts, 682 
F.3d at 9. DOMA, however, goes much further than 
simply trying to save money on federal spending 
programs. Its across-the-board drafting affects many  
statutes, including copyright law, ethics statutes, and 
testimonial privileges, that have zero relationship—
rational or otherwise—to public money. Such an 
indiscriminate exercise of power is improper. 
DOMA goes much further than background checks 
for firearm purchases or the individual-health-
insurance mandate. Because DOMA set a new 
precedent for sweeping congressional power to impose 
a uniform federal family law, it is improper. 
III. DOMA INVADES THE STATES’ RESERVED 
POWERS BY PURPORTING TO DETERMINE 
MARITAL STATUS IN A BLANKET WAY 
This Court closely examines whether “essential 
attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by 
the assertion of federal power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2592 
26 
 
 
 
(Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967-
68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). In DOMA, 
Congress has transgressed “the longstanding 
tradition of reserving domestic relations matters to 
the States.” Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 
186 n.4 (1988). Congress’s unprecedented assertion 
that it has equal power to decide who can marry 
forces States that recognize same-sex marriages to 
adjust their ordinary operations under pressure from 
the federal definition. DOMA also violates 
individuals’ private liberty because it places validly 
married same-sex couples in the odd position of being 
married under state law and yet strangers in the eyes 
of federal law. 
A. Only States Can Confer and Define 
Marital Status under Their Police 
Powers. 
“[R]egulation of domestic relations” is “an area 
that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive 
province of the States.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
404 (1975); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (collecting cases).9 We 
                                            
 
9 The Court has been unanimous on this point. See United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1995) (rejecting 
arguments that “Congress could regulate any activity that it 
found was related to the economic productivity of individual 
citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child 
custody), for example”); id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging limits on federal regulation in those areas). 
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do not maintain that Congress may not legislate in 
any way touching domestic relations, and in fact 
many federal regulations do affect family relations. 
As discussed below and by other amici, some even 
adjust family-status entitlements to suit a federal 
objective. See Family Law Professors Br. 26-32. But 
that does not mean that the national government can 
exercise all the same powers over family law that the 
States exercise. Lopez teaches that something 
important remains with the States. 
This Court has explained what does. Ankenbrandt 
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703, 706 (1992), held that 
the “domestic relations exception” to federal-court 
jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to 
issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,” 
that is, to “determin[e] . . . the status of the parties.” 
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, 
correctly observed that States retain authority over 
the “core” of domestic-relations law, which includes 
“declarations of status, e.g., marriage, annulment, 
divorce, custody, and paternity.” Id. at 716. This 
Court has frequently, and recently, echoed that 
determining family status remains a State power. 
See, e.g., Newdow, 542 U.S. at 16 (“Newdow’s 
parental status is defined by California’s domestic 
relations law.”).10 
                                            
 
10 See also, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 
(1942) (“Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate 
concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its 
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This Court relied on that premise in De Sylva v. 
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). De Sylva decided 
whether an illegitimate child could renew a copyright 
under a federal statute that permitted, if an author 
died, the “widow, widower, or children,” of the author, 
or his “executors” or “next of kin” to renew the 
copyright. Id. at 571-72. The Court held that state 
law determined who were “children” under the Act. 
Id. at 580-81. 
The Court explained that state law created the 
relationships the statute depended on in the first 
place. “To decide who is the widow or widower of a 
deceased author, or who are his executors or next of 
kin, requires a reference to the law of the State which 
created those legal relationships.” 351 U.S. at 580 
(emphasis added). Similarly, the word “children” 
describes a “legal status” that state law created. Ibid. 
“To determine whether a child has been legally 
adopted, for example, requires a reference to state 
law.” Ibid. (emphasis added). In other words, state 
law created family relationships; federal law then 
decided what, if any, authority to renew a copyright 
those relationships deserved. 
                                                                                          
 
borders.”); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (“[E]very 
State possesses [jurisdiction] to determine the civil status and 
capacities of all its inhabitants . . . . The State, for example, has 
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the 
marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and 
the causes for which it may be dissolved.”). 
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That federal dependence on state marriage law is 
consistent with historical practice. The federal 
government has never created domestic statuses 
independently from the States. Other than instances 
like the territories, where the federal government is 
the government with general police power (see 
Family Law Professors Br. 33-35), the federal 
government does not issue marriage licenses or 
divorce decrees. It does not legitimate children, 
perform adoptions, or terminate parental rights. 
Though federal legislation might promote, shape, or 
encourage those relationships, it cannot create or 
extinguish them wholesale. 
DOMA shatters two centuries of federal practice. 
Read plainly and fairly, DOMA creates, for the first 
time, a blanket federal marital status that exists 
independent of States’ family-status determinations. 
See Carpenter, supra, at 10 (“there has never been a 
national definition of marriage”). It defines 
“marriage” and “spouse” across the board for every 
federal purpose and for more than 1100 federal 
statutes. 1 U.S.C. § 7; DAYNA K. SHAH, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: 
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004). 
DOMA’s sweeping language differs markedly from 
the handful of federal statutes that choose to exclude 
from a federal benefit some relationships that state 
law might respect. Compare, for example, the 
immigration antifraud provision. Although that 
statute prohibits conferring resident-alien status 
based on marriages that were “entered into for the 
purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an 
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immigrant,” 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i), it does not 
redefine marriage as DOMA does. It simply says that 
otherwise married couples cannot qualify for this 
particular benefit. Equally important, it serves 
Congress’s “plenary” power to govern immigration 
and its need to close gaping loopholes in immigration 
restrictions. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 
769-70 (1972). It is tailored to that objective: 
“qualifying marriage” is defined in the antifraud 
provision only for the purpose of that provision. 
DOMA reads differently because it was never 
designed to serve a particular federal objective. It 
was deliberately drafted to express Congress’s policy 
judgment rejecting same-sex marriage—that is why it 
is called the “Defense of Marriage Act.” That is why 
its preamble reads, “An act to define and protect the 
institution of marriage.” Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 
2419 (1996). And that is why its legislative history 
makes clear that “Section 3 will mean simply that 
[State-recognized same-sex] ‘marriage’ will not be 
recognized as ‘marriage’ for purposes of federal law.” 
H.R. REP. 104-664 at 31. 
Far from concealing this objective, BLAG defends 
it. Among its five proffered justifications, BLAG 
argues that Congress possesses sovereign authority 
to define marriage for itself. Br. 30. And it insists 
that Congress could enact DOMA for the same 
reasons States can reject same-sex marriage. Br. 30, 
43-49. In other words, as BLAG makes plain, 
DOMA’s drafters and defenders have assumed that 
“the federal government has the same latitude as the 
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states to adopt its own definition of marriage for 
federal-law purposes.” Id. at 19. 
Congress does not enjoy that latitude because the 
Constitution left that power to the States. U.S. CONST. 
Amend. X. The ability to create, define, or dissolve 
marriages is glaringly absent from Congress’s 
enumerated powers and from its historic practice. 
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8; see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586  
(“[S]ometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] 
severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of 
historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.” (quoting 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010))). 
B. DOMA Infringes State Sovereignty 
and Individual Liberty by 
Interfering with Valid Marriages. 
DOMA not only creates a restrictive federal 
marriage status unauthorized by the Constitution, 
but it also interferes with the States’ exercise of their 
reserved power to define marriage for their own 
purposes. DOMA forcibly creates a two-tiered 
marriage system in States that recognize same-sex 
marriage. As a result, DOMA increases those States’ 
administrative costs, needlessly complicates their 
domestic-relations systems and introduces potential 
errors and frustration into their chosen marriage 
regime. DOMA thus discourages States from 
experimenting in this area at all, placing the heavy 
hand of the federal government on one side of the 
scale (through legislation rather than a command of 
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the Constitution, cf. Loving, 388 U.S. 1) for the first 
time in our Nation’s history. 
DOMA also offends same-sex couples’ individual 
interests in stability and predictability of their basic 
personal relationships. DOMA creates two 
contradictory marriage regimes applicable within the 
same territory. It thus undermines both the public 
and private significance of same-sex couples’ State-
sanctioned marriages because it tells them that their 
otherwise valid marriages are invalid in the eyes of 
the federal government. And it blurs vital lines of 
political accountability by forcing individuals to look 
to two sets of laws and officials for redress.  
1. Rather Than Simply Defining 
Marriage for Federal 
Purposes, DOMA Interferes 
with State Law. 
BLAG argues that “DOMA does not interfere with 
or override state law.” Br. 27. That is false. Most 
contemporary federal regulatory and benefits 
programs are cooperative-federalism schemes under 
which States implement federal programs according 
to federal directives. Medicaid is a classic example. 
As Massachusetts explained in related litigation, 
however, DOMA took the “cooperative” aspect out of 
cooperative federalism by forcing the Commonwealth 
to choose between violating state domestic-relations 
law and forgoing billions of dollars in federal funding. 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (D. Mass. 2010). As 
an employer, Massachusetts pays higher taxes when 
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it extends health insurance to its employees’ same-
sex spouses. Id. at 243-44. And it cannot bury 
married same-sex couples together in veterans’ 
cemeteries. Id. at 239-41. 
Medicaid is not the only funding program forcing 
States to choose between state law and federal 
funding. For example, States that have adopted 
programs to promote healthy marriages among 
“spouses,” 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)(iii), presumably 
would similarly lose funding if they extended those 
programs to validly married same-sex couples. 
DOMA interferes with States’ domestic-relations laws 
by undermining States’ ability to enforce divorce 
judgments and spousal-support orders arising from 
divorces of same-sex couples. The Bankruptcy Code 
gives spousal-support obligations the highest priority, 
exempts them from the automatic stay, and generally 
makes them not dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 507, 
523.11 Those accommodations do not extend to 
divorced same-sex couples. See id. § 101. A variety of 
federal statutes help States garnish federal tax 
returns, federal wages, federal benefits, and federal 
pensions to enforce spousal support. E.g., 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408; 42 U.S.C. § 659; 42 U.S.C. § 664; 50 U.S.C. 
                                            
 
11 For a longer list of ways DOMA disrupts bankruptcies of 
same-sex couples, see Jackie Gardina, The Defense of Marriage 
Act, Same-Sex Relationships and the Bankruptcy Code (Vermont 
Law Sch. Faculty Working Paper No. 04-12, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1850926. 
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§ 2094. And the Consumer Credit Protection Act lifts 
severe limits on wage garnishment when the creditor 
is recovering spousal support. 15 U.S.C. § 1673. The 
unavailability of these standard remedies to enforce 
spousal support obligations for same-sex couples 
throws a wrench into the administration of state 
family law. 
States that recognize same-sex marriage likewise 
face added administrative burdens and confusion 
when collecting state taxes. State-income-tax regimes 
often “piggyback” on federal forms, rules, and 
enforcement. Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing 
with DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates 
State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33-41 (2012). DOMA 
disrupts that complementary relationship. Id. at 48-
71. For example, Vermont law provides, “A husband 
and wife or a surviving spouse may file a joint 
Vermont personal income tax return for any taxable 
year for which the husband and wife or surviving 
spouse are permitted to file a joint federal income tax 
return under the laws of the United States.” Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 32, § 5861(c). Because Vermont’s legislature 
has recognized same-sex marriage, id. tit. 15, § 8, 
DOMA has forced the state to issue special rules 
requiring same-sex couples to recalculate their 
federal tax returns as if they had filed jointly. Tech. 
Bull. TB-55, 2010 Vt. Tax LEXIS 6 (Oct. 7, 2010). 
As a final example, DOMA distorts state 
universities’ financial-aid policies. Federal law 
governs eligibility for federal student loans, the 
bedrock of any financial-aid package. Those statutes 
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ordinarily permit States to consider a student’s 
spouse’s income when determining need—unless the 
student is in a same-sex marriage. 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1087nn(b), 1087ss(b)-(c). Universities must thus 
either adopt the federal definition for all their 
financial aid determinations—violating state law—or 
somehow develop a hybrid assessment of need based 
on two separate definitions of family. 
In short, DOMA forces States to adjust their 
ordinary operations to accommodate a federal marital 
status that the affected States would not otherwise 
recognize. The practical consequences are real. States 
have validly married tens of thousands of same-sex 
couples who pay taxes, attend state universities, and 
file for divorce. States that recognize same-sex 
marriage face added administrative burdens and, in 
some cases, greater expenses. As these burdens 
become clearer in practice, some States may well 
decide that departing from the federal vision of 
family is simply too difficult. DOMA thus discourages 
States from experimenting with same-sex marriage 
and punishes those that do. 
DOMA’s interference is all the more concerning 
because it treads in a core area of state authority: 
deciding who is married. DOMA deliberately rejects, 
and so interferes with, some States’ policy judgment 
that “family and society” would be strengthened by 
permitting committed adult couples to marry legally. 
It is hard to imagine a more direct invasion of the 
heart of States’ police powers. 
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2. DOMA Infringes Individual 
Liberty by Pervasively 
Denying the Status of Validly 
Married Couples. 
Throughout history and today, marriage stands as 
“one of the vital personal rights essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Loving, 
388 U.S. at 12. That is why this Court has held that 
“our laws and tradition afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 573-74 (2003). DOMA creates significant 
uncertainty within that private realm. It forces same-
sex couples to live a divided life, married for state 
purposes but unmarried for federal ones. Worse, 
DOMA blurs lines of political accountability for this 
intrusion, particularly when state officials must 
administer federal rules that do not respect marriage 
rights under state law. Without DOMA, same-sex 
marriage would be either legal or illegal in any given 
State. Same-sex couples would know their rights, and 
both proponents and opponents of those marriages 
would know which level of government to petition to 
change the law.  
For the first time, the federal government, 
without individualized determinations (such as 
“sham” marriages entered into for immigration 
purposes), has created dual domestic statuses—a 
person who thought he was a spouse suddenly enjoys 
the benefits and bears the burdens of that status only 
partially and episodically. Married same-sex couples 
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have, at the state level, all the rights, privileges, and 
obligations of married couples. They file joint tax 
returns, enjoy preferential inheritance and tax 
treatment on their shared property, and live as one 
another’s life partners and next of kin. Yet, whenever 
they interact with federal law, they are no different 
than college roommates. 
That interaction with federal marriage law is 
pervasive. Same-sex spouses cannot obtain Social 
Security or Medicare based on their partners’ work 
histories. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402. Same-sex couples 
cannot file joint tax returns or enjoy the preferential 
tax treatment that opposite-sex marriages do. E.g., 26 
U.S.C. §§ 106, 152, 2053, 2056, 6013. 
But DOMA goes well beyond federal spending and 
taxing. Same-sex spouses enjoy no testimonial privi-
leges. They cannot take leave to care for a sick spouse 
under the Family Medical Leave Act. See 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 2611-12, § 2614. Nor can divorcing spouses obtain 
COBRA coverage from their spouses’ employers. See 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1161, 1163. Same-sex spouses lack 
notification and access rights when their spouses are 
in some health-care facilities. See, e.g., 24 U.S.C. 
§ 325(b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i, 1396r. 
DOMA most deeply affects government employees, 
especially members of the Armed Forces, and their 
families. Everything from access to federal pensions 
to maintenance stipends to relocation expenses to 
health insurance depends on marital status. See, e.g., 
5 U.S.C. §§ 5724a, 5924, 8341, 8442, 8445, 8901, 
8905. Same-sex spouses are particularly excluded 
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from the many programs—such as education and 
employment assistance—the military offers to assist 
families of members and veterans of the Armed 
Forces to ease the burdens military life places on 
them. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1078a, 1143, 
11447-48, 1784, 2147; 20 U.S.C. § 932; 38 U.S.C. 
§§ 1781, 3501, 1311. DOMA even bars same-sex 
spouses whose partners are killed in military service 
from receiving compensation, notice, and 
bereavement services. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8133; 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1115; 22 U.S.C. § 2715b; 22 U.S.C. § 1783.  
Thus DOMA places same-sex couples in the 
untenable and humiliating position of being married 
and yet, for any purpose touching federal law, being 
denied the ordinary rights and duties that have 
historically flowed from that status. By placing them 
in a legal labyrinth of changing status, DOMA injects 
uncertainty into the most fundamental and intimate 
aspects of these couples’ lives. For the first time, 
individuals cannot rely on their States to settle their 
marital status definitively, allowing them to order 
their affairs accordingly. 
This Court has recognized a basic interest in 
predictability in contexts far less fundamental than 
this one. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (striking down a state-minimum-
wage law under the Due Process Clause’s void-for-
vagueness doctrine because of the uncertainties it 
imposed on employers); Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 
at 728-29 (discouraging creation of federal common 
law when it would “disrupt commercial relationships 
predicated on state law”). It is inconceivable that 
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Congress would be permitted to inject similar 
uncertainty into other basic family-status 
relationships. If DOMA is valid, however, it is hard to 
say why the federal government could not adopt a 
blanket definition of “children” or “parent” that 
excluded adopted children or children conceived using 
sperm or egg donors. BLAG’s assertion that Congress 
can undermine the very relationships this Court has 
said are “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923), has implications far beyond same-sex 
marriage. 
This Court has also recognized the value of 
identifying a single sovereign responsible for regula-
tory decisions so that the correct officials may be held 
accountable for those decisions through the demo-
cratic process. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 930; New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992). By 
undermining marriage rights conferred by state law, 
often in cooperative-federalism contexts where state 
officials will have to enforce the federal definition, 
DOMA blurs the “distinct and discernible lines of 
political responsibility” that are vital if “political 
accountability [is not to] become illusory.” United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally MICHAEL S. 
GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 77 (2012) 
(discussing the structural federalism principle of “one 
problem, one sovereign”).  
Thankfully, the Constitution avoids these serious 
problems by leaving the power to determine those 
relationships to the States. Not every State will 
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resolve these questions to the liking of same-sex 
couples. But if States are permitted to fix family 
status with certainty, then same-sex couples can 
either hold the state officials responsible for that 
decision to account through ordinary political 
processes or move to a more congenial jurisdiction. 
Any State’s choice remains subject, of course, to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s constraints, and we do not 
argue that state sovereignty provides any reason to 
narrowly construe the Equal Protection Clause. But 
unless equal protection requires recognition of same-
sex marriage, the Constitution best protects liberty of 
same-sex marriages proponents and opponents by 
guaranteeing each State the right to decide for itself. 
That is inevitably a somewhat messy solution, but it 
is the best option that the Constitution provides for 
those issues on which we have not yet reached a 
social consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
affirmed.  
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Respectfully submitted. 
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